Mickai Subsystem
Mickai TPM Attestation™
Mickai TPM Attestation is the subsystem of the Mickai SIOS that anchors operator identity to the hardware. ML-DSA-65 keys generated on a TPM 2.0 chip, attestation quotes proving it, PCR-bound keys, fallback to attestation-none on dev machines. Mickai is downloadable at mickai.co.uk/download and runs on Windows, Linux, or macOS.
View capabilitiesThe Mickai SIOS
Mickai is a Sovereign Intelligence Operating System (SIOS). It runs entirely on your own hardware, on Windows, Linux, or macOS. No cloud, no telemetry. This page describes one subsystem of the Mickai SIOS. Download Mickai at mickai.co.uk/download.
A subsystem of the Mickai SIOS. Hardware identity at the operator-key level. ML-DSA-65 keys generated on a TPM 2.0 chip, with attestation quotes proving it.
Hardware identity, anchored to the chip.
What TPM Attestation guarantees
Seven primitives that bind the operator key to the chip. TPM 2.0 and Apple Secure Enclave, attestation quote, PCR-bound sealing, public discoverability, dev-machine fallback, hardware-rotation flow, ML-DSA-65 from the chip.
01 / Hardware
TPM 2.0 and Apple Secure Enclave
Operator keys are generated inside a TPM 2.0 chip on Windows and Linux, and inside the Apple Secure Enclave on macOS. The private key never leaves the chip. Sealed against the boot measurement, so a tampered boot cannot use the key.
02 / Quote
Attestation quote
Every cold start produces a TPM 2.0 attestation quote signed by the chip's endorsement key. The quote includes PCR values measuring the boot chain and is published at /.well-known/mickai-operator-key.json so a relying party can verify the operator without trusting Mickai.
03 / PCR
PCR-bound keys
The operator key is sealed against a specific PCR profile: a recognised firmware version, a recognised kernel hash, a recognised Mickai runtime hash. Boot the wrong firmware and the key cannot be unsealed; the chain records the failure.
04 / Discoverability
Public quote at /.well-known/
Any verifier on the network can fetch /.well-known/mickai-operator-key.json and read the operator public key plus the latest attestation quote. The verifier walks the quote, checks the chip endorsement against the published manufacturer roots, and confirms the key is operator-controlled hardware.
05 / Fallback
Attestation: none on dev
On developer machines without a TPM, the runtime falls back to attestation: none and a software-generated key. The chain records the attestation status on every entry, so a downstream verifier can decide whether to trust the deployment.
06 / Rotation
Hardware rotation flow
When the operator rotates hardware, a signed migration envelope is produced on the old chip, then countersigned on the new chip. The audit chain records the rotation; relying parties update their published key store via the signed migration.
07 / Signature
ML-DSA-65 from the chip
Where the TPM supports post-quantum signatures, Mickai uses ML-DSA-65 directly from the chip. Where it does not, a software-side ML-DSA-65 key is sealed under a TPM-backed wrapping key. Either way the signature is post-quantum and the secret is hardware-bound.
Patent anchors
TPM Attestation sits on three of the 31 filed UK patent applications behind the Mickai SIOS. Patent 08 anchors ML-DSA-65 signing, patent 24 the trust-domain externalisation via /.well-known/, patent 28 PCR-bound mode attestation.
- 08Quantum-Safe Attestation with ML-DSA-65, the signing primitive on the TPM key.
- 24Trust Domain Externalisation, attestation quote at /.well-known/ for offline verification.
- 28Cryptographic Mode Attestation, PCR-bound key sealing and runtime-mode attestation.
GB2607309.8 to GB2610422.4 · 31 filed UK patent applications · 914 claims
Wired with
- TPM 2.0 on Windows and Linux, Apple Secure Enclave on macOS
- Operator key sealed against PCR boot measurement
- TPM attestation quote on every cold start
- Public quote at /.well-known/mickai-operator-key.json
- ML-DSA-65 from the chip where supported
- TPM-wrapped software key fallback otherwise
- Attestation: none on dev machines, recorded in the chain
- Signed hardware-rotation migration envelopes
Operator identity, anchored to silicon.
Mickai TPM Attestation seals the operator key to a TPM 2.0 chip and publishes a quote any verifier can check. Read the attestation patent, or download Mickai and bind your first signing key to your hardware.
Engineered by Micky Irons in Cumbria, United Kingdom · @mickyirons